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Sammendrag:. Dette notatet tar for seg politiske 
virkemidler for å begrense utslipp fra mobile kilder, og 
muligheten for å kunne bruke denne politikken i Kina. 
Første del av notatet ser på USAs erfaringer med 
utslippskontroll fra mobile kilder siden slike 
reguleringer ble innført i ”Clean Air Act” fra 1970. De 
viktigste punktene fra denne politikken og trender i 
utslippene fra mobile kilder i perioden 1970 til 2000 
blir diskutert. Andre del av notatet diskuterer mulige 
politiske virkemidler som kan brukes for å kontrollere 
forurensing fra mobile kilder, fra tradisjonelle direkte 
reguleringer til markedsbaserte virkemidler. Erfaringer 
med bruk av økonomiske incentiver i USA og andre 
land vil også bli diskutert. Tredje del av dette notatet 
diskuterer hva USAs erfaringer med å kontrollere 
forurensing fra mobile kilder kan bety for Kina. Selv 
om markedsbaserte virkemidler kan være passende på 
mange områder av Kinas forurensingspolitikk, vil 
forskjeller i institusjonell struktur i Kina og USA 
antyde en gradvis innføring av slike virkemidler. 
Notatet avslutter med en konklusjon. 
   
Abstract: This paper reviews policies for the control 
of mobile source pollution and their potential 
application in China.  The first section of the paper 
reviews the U.S. experience with mobile source 
pollution control since regulations were first 
established in the Clean Air Act of 1970.  Highlights 
in the policy and trends in vehicle emissions over the 
1970 to 2000 time period are discussed.  The second 
section of the paper discusses the range of policy 
instruments that could be used to control vehicle 
pollution, ranging from traditional direct regulations to 
market-based instruments.  Experiences with the use 
of economic incentives in the United States and 
elsewhere are also discussed.  The third section of the 
paper discusses possible implications of the U.S. 
experience for controlling vehicle pollution in China.  
While market-based instruments might be particularly 
appropriate for use in several aspects of China’s 
pollution control policies, important differences 
between the institutional structures in China and the 
United States suggest that they should be phased in 
gradually.  The paper closes with concluding remarks.  
 
Språk: Engelsk Language of report:  English 
 
Rapporten kan bestilles fra: 
CICERO Senter for klimaforskning 
P.B. 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo 
 
 
Eller lastes ned fra: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no 
 
The report may be ordered from: 
CICERO (Center for International Climate and 
Environmental Research – Oslo) 
PO Box 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo, NORWAY 
 
Or be downloaded from: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 1 
2 THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH VEHICLE POLLUTION CONTROL............................................... 2 
2.1 THE U.S. REGULATORY APPROACH ........................................................................................................ 2 
2.2 TRENDS IN MOBILE SOURCE EMISSIONS, 1970–1999 .............................................................................. 6 
2.3 AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY............................................................................................................ 9 
3 POLICY DESIGN FOR MOBILE SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL............................................ 12 
3.1 THE RANGE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS .................................................................................................. 12 
3.2 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................................... 14 
3.3 ECONOMIC INCENTIVE POLICIES IN PRACTICE....................................................................................... 16 
4 CONTROLLING MOTOR VEHICLE POLLUTION IN CHINA ....................................................... 18 
5 CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................................... 24 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Camilla Bretteville, Lin Gan, and Lynn P. Nygaard for comments on an earlier 
version of this paper.  This paper was completed while I was visiting Fulbright scholar at CICERO.  
Thanks to CICERO for hosting my visit and to the Norway-U.S. Fulbright Foundation for financial 
assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CICERO Working Paper 2002:01 
Mobile source pollution control in the United States and China  
 
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s, control of emissions from mobile sources has been a concern of U.S. air 
pollution control policy.  Nonetheless, vehicle emissions continue to play an important role in 
causing air pollution problems at the local, regional, and national levels in the United States.  
Although pollution control standards for vehicles have become much more stringent over 
time, mobile source emissions, particularly from passenger vehicles, continue to be 
significant because of a combination of Americans’ desire for larger cars, increases in 
vehicle-miles traveled, and economic growth.  It is becoming increasingly clear that advances 
in technology will not be sufficient to overcome increasing environmental impacts from 
growing motor vehicle use worldwide and that current road transportation systems are not 
environmentally sustainable over the long term (OECD 2001a).  Even with continued 
progress toward reducing discharges of conventional regional pollutants, transportation 
sources are now the fastest-growing source of global greenhouse-gas emissions.  Thus, the 
control of mobile source emissions is a very important policy problem.  
China faces similar, if not more critical, problems in attempting to control pollution 
from mobile sources.  China’s rapid economic growth and increase in living standards has led 
to greater demand for passenger cars to provide more convenient and flexible transportation.  
Like the United States and other developed countries, China’s transportation policies tend to 
encourage the use of vehicles powered by fossil fuels.  Increasing urbanization and the rising 
use of automobiles in China have led to numerous environmental problems, particularly in 
major cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai (Kebin and Chang 2000).  Although 
the energy and industrial sectors are currently the biggest contributors to urban air pollution in 
China, economic growth will undoubtedly increase demand for vehicles, transportation 
infrastructure, and services.  The number of urban vehicles in China is expected to be from 13 
to 22 times greater in 2020 than in the late 1990s, and this could have a major influence on air 
pollution in China’s biggest cities (Stares and Zhi 1995, 50).  To avoid continuing air quality 
problems, particularly in more densely populated regions, aggressive measures will be 
required to manage emissions from mobile sources.   
For a number of reasons, designing and implementing policies to control vehicle 
pollution is particularly difficult.  First, controlling mobile source pollution is fundamentally 
different than controlling stationary source pollution because the problem results from a large 
number of highly mobile sources, each of which emits a negligible amount of pollution.  
Second, the various types of policy measures for controlling mobile source pollution have not 
received the same attention as alternative policies for controlling stationary source pollution.  
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Regulations in most countries still rely primarily on new-vehicle emissions standards aimed at 
manufacturers, complemented by inspection programs for testing emissions of vehicles in use.  
This is striking since it is widely held that existing policies have been ineffective in 
controlling vehicle pollution – either by design or in practice – throughout the world.  Third, 
the effect of current regulations on technological innovation in vehicle and fuel technologies 
is unclear.  For example, it is not known whether regulations aimed at vehicle manufacturers 
are more effective than measures directed at users in providing incentives for adopting more 
environmentally friendly transportation products.  Finally, the predominant role of the 
automobile in the modern lifestyle makes the control of mobile source pollution difficult for 
political reasons.  
This paper reviews U.S. policies for controlling pollution from mobile sources and 
considers possible implications for the development of vehicle pollution policies in China.  
The next section of the paper reviews U.S. policy since 1970, analyzes trends in emissions of 
regional air pollutants, and evaluates key elements of the policy.  The following section 
discusses various policy measures for controlling mobile source pollution and reviews the 
rationale for the use of economic incentives for pollution control.  Examples of 
environmental-related economic incentives for mobile sources in the United States are then 
discussed.  The next section of the paper considers the implications of this experience for 
China and makes policy recommendations.   
 
2 The U.S. experience with vehicle pollution control 
2.1 The U.S. regulatory approach 
The approach used in the United States to control mobile source pollution relies on federal 
laws and regulations complemented by state initiatives and, more recently, joint efforts 
between the federal government and automakers to develop new technologies in vehicles and 
fuels.  The framework legislation is the Clean Air Act of 1970, which is administered by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Under this law, the federal government sets 
national air quality standards for carbon monoxide (CO), lead, nitrogen oxides (NOx), ozone, 
particulate matter (PM), and sulfur dioxide (SO2).  The EPA monitors air quality and 
emissions of these pollutants on a regular basis.  In addition, the Clean Air Act sets 
mandatory numerical standards for emissions of CO, hydrocarbons, and NOx from new 
vehicles.  Emissions performance standards for new vehicles are supplemented by emissions 
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inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs for vehicles used in areas that are having 
difficulty meeting air quality standards.      
Table 1 shows milestones in U.S. policy controlling mobile source emissions since 
1970.  Federal regulations have focused on controlling emissions from highway vehicles such 
as passenger cars, trucks, and buses, although off-road sources are now also regulated.  The 
government also has used its authority to regulate lead and other fuel additives.  A variety of 
technological specifications dealing with vehicles, fuels, and other components of the 
transportation system are also required in geographical areas not meeting federal air quality 
guidelines (nonattainment areas).  In addition to federal government regulations, some states 
(most notably, California) have adopted stricter emissions standards for vehicles and/or 
developed transportation plans to reduce the number of vehicle-miles traveled in their 
jurisdictions.  Over the years, as federal emissions standards for new vehicles have become 
more stringent and more requirements imposed on nonattainment areas in an effort to bring 
them into compliance with air quality standards, the EPA has introduced numerous flexibility 
provisions to reduce program costs.    
 
Table 1.   Milestones in U.S. Vehicle Emissions Control 
 
1970 Clean Air Act establishes auto emissions standards. 
1971 Charcoal canisters introduced to meet evaporative standards. 
1973   EGR valves appear to meet NOx standards. 
1975   First catalytic converters appear for HC and CO.  Unleaded gas appears for use. 
1981   3-way catalysts with on-board computers and O2 sensors appear. 
1983   Inspection and maintenance programs established in 64 cities. 
1990   Clean Air Act amendments set new tailpipe standards. 
1993   Limits set on sulfur content of diesel fuel. 
1994   Phase in begins of new vehicle standards and technologies. 
1995   On-board diagnostic systems appear in new cars. 
1998   Sales of 1999 model year vehicles meeting California standards begin in northeast. 
2000   EPA allows averaging, banking, and trading for automakers to achieve NOx standards 
 
Sources:  USEPA 1994.   
 
The 1970 Clean Air Act mandated emissions standards for new cars through a 
certification program and an associated enforcement program that includes assembly line 
testing of vehicles, warranty requirements, and recall provisions.  The certification program 
requires that prototypes of new vehicles be tested for conformance with federal emissions 
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performance standards before they can be manufactured or sold.  Prototype vehicles from 
each engine family must pass emissions tests that simulate driving experiences over the useful 
life of the vehicle.  The current performance standards for new light-duty cars and trucks are 
set in two tiers.  The first refers to the first five years, or 50,000 miles of use, and the second 
establishes less stringent standards for the remainder of the vehicle’s life (ten years, or 
100,000 miles of use).1  
Federal regulations include warranty provisions designed to insure that vehicles will 
meet emission standards not only at the time of purchase but over a vehicle’s entire usable 
life.  There are two sets of warranty provisions. The first holds manufacturers responsible for 
fixing any defects in a vehicle’s emissions control equipment that could result in its failure to 
meet the standards during the vehicle’s entire usable life.  The second provision requires the 
manufacturer to bring any car that fails an emissions test within the first 24 months or 24,000 
miles into conformance with the standards.  After this period, the warranty is limited to 
replacement of devices (e.g., catalytic converters) for emissions control.   
The Clean Air Act gives responsibility to the states to develop regulations to insure 
that ambient air quality standards are met within their jurisdictions.  Amendments to the Act 
in 1977 recognized the existence of nonattainment areas and placed special requirements on 
local authorities to bring those areas into compliance.  Since vehicle emissions were the 
source of air quality problems in many nonattainment areas, local authorities in those areas 
were required to take further actions to reduce mobile source emissions, including the 
establishment of I/M programs to test emissions from vehicles in use.  Emissions testing 
programs typically involve regularly scheduled emissions measurements of CO, HC, and NOx 
from passenger cars and light trucks and visual checks of pollution control equipment.2  
Vehicles that fail inspection must be re-inspected after repairs are made.  Some states exempt 
extremely old vehicles and vehicles whose owners have low incomes.   
Major revisions were made in 1990 to the Clean Air Act in an attempt to further 
reduce emissions of CO, HC, NOx, and particulate matter from vehicles.  Stricter standards 
were set for tailpipe emissions from all types of highway vehicles, and I/M programs were 
expanded to include more areas, allow for more stringent tests, and require residents in certain 
areas to have their cars repaired and re-tested for conformance with standards.  Cars and light 
trucks will by 2004 be required to meet the same emissions standards, and gasoline and 
diesel-fueled vehicles must meet identical standards.  For the first time, other states were 
1 The current exhaust emission standards are in USEPA 2000 and Sec. 202, Clean Air Act amendments 
of 1990, at www.epa.gov/oar/caa/caa202.txt. 
2 See USEPA 1999.   
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allowed to adopt California new-vehicle emissions standards.  The diesel particulate standard 
for buses in urban areas was reduced by 60 percent, and the EPA was given authority to 
regulate emissions from off-road sources, including locomotives, construction equipment, and 
lawnmowers.  In response to continuing air quality problems, some urban areas had to require 
the installation of vapor recovery systems on nozzles of gasoline pumps and the use of clean 
fuels in 30 percent of new vehicles purchased by centrally fueled fleets.     
The 1990 amendments also established a “clean fuel” vehicles program.  Certain 
nonattainment areas were required to establish programs for the adoption of clean fuel 
vehicles by centrally managed vehicle fleets.  Fleet owners who surpass the requirements are 
awarded emissions credits that can be banked for future use or traded.  California was given 
the authority to adopt a program to require automobile manufacturers to produce and sell a 
certain number of “clean” vehicles if they wished to sell cars in the state.  In September 1990, 
the California Air Resources Board passed low-emissions vehicle (LEV) and zero-emissions 
vehicle (ZEV) regulations.  The LEV regulation established increasingly strict emissions 
standards over time, starting in 1994, for conventional fuel vehicles.  Manufacturers can 
produce and certify cars with different emissions levels (including those that meet federal 
standards), but to be in compliance the average emissions across the fleet (weighted by sales) 
must achieve the specified standards.  The ZEV regulation requires that at least 10 percent of 
new car sales be zero-emitting vehicles by 2003, although partial ZEV credits are granted for 
extremely clean vehicles that are not pure ZEVs (California Air Resources Board 2001). 
 The federal government and some states have also implemented regulations to require 
the use of newly developed cleaner fuels or to constrain the use of other fuels.  Certain 
nonattainment areas are required to offer only “cleaner” gasoline for sale to motorists, 
including reformulated gasoline in certain ozone nonattainment areas to reduce emissions of 
hydrocarbons and toxic air pollutants and oxygenated gasoline in certain CO nonattainment 
areas.3  For example, specially formulated fuel has been provided in Denver, Colorado, during 
the winter in an attempt to reduce its CO problem.  The federal government prohibited the use 
of any fuel containing lead or lead additives after 1995 and has also set limits on the sulfur 
content of diesel fuels used in highway vehicles. 
In addition to programs aimed at existing vehicles and fuels, there have been joint 
initiatives among U.S. automakers (General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler) and the 
federal government in response to stiffer federal emissions requirements and California 
3 Market-based incentives are being used to implement this requirement.  Marketable credits are issued 
for fuels that exceed legal requirements, thus capping the amount that can be sold.  The credits can be 
used by the recipient or transferred to another source in the same nonattainment area.    
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regulations.  The Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles was formed in 1993 to 
facilitate the development and production of fuel-efficient, low-emissions vehicles.  The goal 
of the cooperative effort was to conceive and develop by the year 2004 a “marketable and 
affordable” vehicle with up to three times the fuel economy of existing mid-sized sedans (80 
miles per gallon gasoline equivalent), with the assistance of $1.5 billion in government 
subsidies.  In January and February 2000, each manufacturer introduced concept cars: the 
DaimlerChrysler ESX3, the Ford Prodigy, and the General Motors Precept.  All three vehicles 
incorporate hybrid-electric power trains with small turbo-charged diesel fuel engines that shut 
down when the vehicle comes to rest (Standing Committee to Review the Research Program 
of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles 2001).  In January 2002, the federal 
Department of Energy announced an alternative program aimed at more fundamental R & D 
with the long run goal of replacing the internal combustion engine with engines powered by 
fuel cells (Bannerjee 2002).  Under the FreedomCAR program, automakers will also seek to 
develop new technologies applicable to both hybrid and fuel cell approaches, e.g. batteries 
and electronic components.   
2.2 Trends in mobile source emissions, 1970–1999 
 Data on U.S. emissions of criteria pollutants from 1970 to 1999 are presented in Tables 2 and 
3.  Table 2 shows total emissions and emissions from transportation sources for the six 
criteria pollutants.  Table 3 shows emissions by type of pollutant for specific categories of 
mobile sources.  Nationwide emissions of all criteria pollutants except NOx fell from 1970 to 
1999, and emissions from transportation sources followed the same general pattern as overall 
emissions.4  As of 1999, emissions from transportation sources accounted for 77 percent of 
CO emissions, 56 percent of NOx emissions, and 47 percent of VOCs.  The share of mobile 
source emissions relative to total nationwide emissions stayed relatively constant from 1970 
to 1999 for CO and VOCs but rose for NOx.  On-road vehicles are the dominant source of 
emissions from the transport sector (Table 3). Light-duty gasoline-powered vehicles (cars and 
trucks) account for the predominant share of CO, NOx, and VOC emissions from on-road 
vehicles, but their share of all criteria pollutants has been decreasing over time.  
The decrease in lead emissions since 1970 has been particularly dramatic.  The 
reduction resulted from the gradual phase out of lead in vehicle fuels in conjunction with the 
use of catalytic converters.  Nationwide particulate (PM-10) emissions decreased by 75  
4 It should be noted that air quality measures for all criteria pollutants (including NOx) improved over 
this time period. A principal reason for the discrepancy for NOx is that air quality is monitored 
primarily in urban areas whereas emissions are based on nationwide estimates.    
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Table 2. U.S. national and transportation sector emissions trends, 1970-1999* 
 
Pollutant  1970 1980 1990 1995 1999 
Carbon Monoxide 
(CO) Transportation 
 
100,004 
 
92,538 
  
76,635  
  
75,035  
 
75,151 
 Total 
 
129,444 
 
117,434 
  
99,119  
  
94,058  
 
97,441 
 
Transportation share 
(percent) 77.26 78.80 77.32 79.78 77.12
Lead (Pb) –Tons Transportation 
 
181,698 
 
64,706 
  
1,197  
  
564         536 
 Total 
 
220,869 
 
74,153 
  
4,975  
  
3,929  
 
4,199 
 
Transportation share 
(percent) 82.27 87.26 24.06 14.35 12.76
Particulate Matter 
(PM-10) Transportation        786        786 
  
838  
  
756         753 
 Total   12,325     6,258 
  
3,340  
  
3,165  
 
3,045 
 
Transportation share 
(percent) 6.38 12.56 25.09 23.89 24.73
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Transportation     9,322 
 
12,150 
  
12,014 
  
13,085  
 
14,105 
 Total   20,928 
 
24,384 
  
24,170  
  
25,051  
 
25,393 
 
Transportation share 
(percent) 44.54 49.83 49.71 52.23 55.55
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Transportation        494        697 
  
1,476  
  
1,311  
 
1,299 
 Total   31,161 
 
25,905
  
23,678  
  
19,188  
 
18,687 
 
Transportation share 
(percent) 1.59 2.69 6.23 6.83 6.95
Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOCs) Transportation   14,849 
 
11,291 
  
8,988 
  
8,515  
 
8,529 
 Total   30,982 
 
26,336 
  
21,053  
  
20,918  
 
18,145 
 
Transportation share 
(percent) 47.93 42.87 42.69 40.71 47.00
 
* Annual emissions, in thousands of short tons, except lead (long tons) 
Source: USEPA 2002b. 
 
 
percent over the time period, but the amount coming from transportation sources remained 
relatively constant because of the increased use of diesel engines, particularly in non-road 
uses (Table 3).  Particulate matter includes both coarse (PM-10) particulates emitted directly 
into the atmosphere and fine (PM-2.5) particles, formed in the atmosphere from primary 
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gaseous emissions such as sulfates and nitrates.  While reductions in PM-10 emissions have 
been significant, there is increasing concern about PM-2.5 levels because of their health 
effects.  Transportation sources account for a small share of total SOx emissions, but 
emissions from vehicles increased from 1970 to 1999, largely due to increased emissions 
from non-road vehicles. 
Table 3. U.S. transportation sector emissions trends, by category, 1970–1999* 
 CO Pb PM NOx SOx VOC
Light-duty gasoline 
autos       
1970    64,031  142,918        225      4,158       132     9,193 
1980    53,561   47,184        120      4,421       159     5,907 
1990    34,996        314          57      3,013       129     3,692 
1995    29,787          14          55      3,043       126     3,029 
1999    27,382          24          58      2,859       137     2,911 
Light-duty gasoline 
trucks  
1970    16,570   22,683          70      1,278         40     2,770 
1980    16,137   11,671          55      1,408         50     2,059 
1990    17,118        100          37      1,552         19     2,016 
1995    19,434           5          41      1,991         93     2,135 
1999    16,115           7          46      1,638         91     1,722 
Heavy-duty gasoline 
vehicles  
1970      6,712     6,361          13        278           8        743 
1980      7,189     1,646          15        300         10        611 
1990      5,029           7          10        306         10        405 
1995      4,103          -             9        330         11        325 
1999      4,262           1          12        459         17        375 
Diesel-powered 
vehicles  
1970         721          -         136      1,676       231        266 
1980      1,139          -         208      2,493       303        402 
1990      1,233          -         225      2,340       352        331 
1995      1,447          -         185      2,591         82        326 
1999      2,217          -         186      3,635       118        289 
Non-road vehicles  
1970    11,970     9,737        220      1,931         83     1,878 
1980    14,489     4,205        398      3,529       175     2,312 
1990    18,191        776        489      4,804       916     2,545 
1995    20,244        544        456      5,128       999     2,699 
1999    25,162        515        458      5,515       936     3,232 
* Thousands of short tons, except lead (long tons)  
Source: USEPA 2002b. 
 
 Total emissions of CO decreased by 25 percent from 1970 to 1999, and the share 
from transportation sources remained relatively constant.  Most of the reduction in mobile 
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source CO emissions over the time period came from automobiles.  Light-duty passenger car 
CO emissions decreased by 57 percent, while CO emissions from non-road vehicles increased 
by 110 percent.  Vehicle CO emissions comprised 52 percent of the nationwide total in 1999, 
while emissions from non-road uses contributed 25 percent of nationwide emissions (Table 
3).  High concentrations of CO generally occur in areas with heavy traffic congestion such as 
cities, where automobile exhaust contributes 95 percent of all CO emissions in the United 
States (USEPA 2001a).   
 From 1970 to 1999, total NOx emissions increased by 21 percent, while NOx 
emissions from mobile sources increased by 51 percent.  The share of mobile source 
emissions relative to total NOx emissions increased steadily over the time period, accounting 
for 45 percent of total emissions in 1970 and 56 percent in 1999.  It is noteworthy, however, 
that NOx emissions from light-duty gasoline automobiles and trucks decreased by 17 percent 
from 1970 to 1999 despite an increase in the number of miles traveled by these vehicles.  
Most of the increase in NOx emissions came from non-road engines (primarily construction 
and recreation equipment) and diesel vehicles.  EPA issued a rule in 1998 that required 22 
states and the District of Columbia to revise their implementation plans to further reduce NOx 
emissions by taking advantage of newer, cleaner control strategies.  The rule did not mandate 
how the reductions are to be achieved, but gives each affected state a NOx emissions target.  
The goal of this program is to reduce total emissions of NOx by 1.2 million tons in the 
affected states by 2007.  
2.3 An assessment of U.S. policy 
There has been criticism in the United States of the command and control regime of 
controlling mobile source pollution since 1970, particularly among economists who view the 
program as being considerably more costly than necessary.  The costs could be too high either 
because the standards themselves are too stringent, resulting in program costs exceeding 
benefits, or because the methods used for pollution abatement are not minimum-cost methods.  
A number of economic incentive measures for controlling vehicle pollution were introduced 
during the 1990s in an effort to allow ambient emissions standards and air quality standards to 
be met more cost-effectively.  An important finding from the U.S. experience is that 
economic incentives and flexibility mechanisms can play a role in mobile source pollution 
control policy, albeit an indirect one.   
U.S. policy on controlling mobile source pollution has evolved since the Clean Air 
Act of 1970, but the effort is still focused largely on emissions performance standards that 
must be met before a new vehicle can be sold.  One of the arguments for focusing on the point 
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where vehicles are produced is that it is less costly to administer a program aimed at a few 
manufacturers than program directed at motorists.  It has also been argued that setting 
stringent controls at the point of manufacture provides incentives for the development of 
cleaner technologies.  On the other hand, factory-controlled emissions performance 
diminishes during normal usage, and drivers ultimately make the decision of which vehicle to 
drive as well as when, how, and where it is driven.  Thus, even if strict new-vehicle 
performance standards are in place, motorists must bear at least partial responsibility for 
controlling pollution by maintaining the emissions performance of in-use vehicles.    
New-car emissions standards were initially set in 1970 at extremely stringent levels to 
be achieved over a relatively short time period.  Manufacturers were required to reduce new-
car CO and HC emissions by 90 percent and NOx emissions by a comparable amount by 
1975.  This caused problems by setting an infeasible compliance schedule for both 
manufacturers to meet mandated emissions standards and localities to meet ambient air 
quality standards.5  Even if manufacturers could have met the emissions standards quickly, 
they applied only to new cars that comprise a small portion of the entire fleet.  Thus it was 
impossible for localities to meet the ambient standards until well after the legal deadline.  The 
problem continued for a number of years and included legal challenges involving the EPA, 
states, and environmental organizations.  The impasse was finally resolved when deadlines 
for compliance with the emissions standards were subsequently extended in 1997 when the 
Clean Air Act was revised. 
Focusing on emissions from new vehicles only partially addresses the mobile source 
pollution problem because new vehicles comprise just a portion of the entire fleet.  Tighter 
new vehicle standards also increase their costs relative to older vehicles.  This provides an 
incentive to drive older vehicles longer and causes emissions reductions to occur more slowly 
than if the program targeted both new and in-use sources (Gruensprecht 1982).  The problem 
is being dealt with primarily by holding manufacturers responsible for maintaining a vehicle’s 
emissions performance over a longer time period.  However, until emissions from all vehicles 
are treated uniformly, the problem will remain.  Emissions testing (i.e., I/M) programs are 
required only in nonattainment areas and have not been very successful even there.  An 
important finding of numerous studies is that emissions tend to be concentrated in a relatively 
small number of gross emitters.6  Since I/M programs usually test every vehicle rather than 
5 Local areas were using new-car emission standards to comply with ambient air quality standards. For 
an account of this experience, see Tietenberg 2001, 320).  
6 For example, a National Academy of Sciences study found that typically less than 10% of the fleet 
contributes more than 50 percent of emissions for a given pollutant (National Academy of Sciences 
2001, 4-5). 
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concentrating on those likely to be high emitters, too many resources are devoted to 
inspecting relatively “clean” vehicles.  The cost-effectiveness of emissions testing programs 
could be considerably enhanced if older vehicles and those with malfunctioning emissions 
controls were the primary target of these programs.  The use of remote-sensing devices, more 
sophisticated on-board diagnostic systems, and non-scheduled inspections have also been 
suggested as ways to enhance the effectiveness of testing programs. 
It can be argued, however, that the problems with U.S. emissions testing programs are 
not entirely technical.  Under the current approach, motorists bear most of the responsibility 
and costs for maintaining the emissions performance of vehicles, but have little incentive to 
insure that emissions from their vehicle are controlled.  Drivers bear the time and travel costs 
of taking the vehicle to a test facility, the expense of diagnosing emissions test failures, and 
the cost of re-testing those that need to be repaired.  They also bear the costs of repairs to 
pollution control equipment – except warranty repairs – to bring a vehicle into compliance.  
The incentive to avoid repairs is greatest for those with the dirtiest vehicles.  Alternative 
liability assignments might be more effective, including emissions-related charges to vehicle 
users, extending liability for emissions performance of in-use vehicles to the manufacturer, or 
subsidizing repairs to nonconforming ones. 
Another problem with mobile source emissions standards relates to their uniformity.  
First, they are uniform across geographic areas, with the exception of California and some 
other states.  Since the effect of emissions on ambient air quality depends on the number of 
vehicles, the composition of the fleet, driving patterns, meteorological conditions, and other 
factors, uniform standards are unlikely to be efficient.  Vehicle emissions will be over-
controlled in regions with unusually low benefits (or high costs), while they will be under-
controlled in areas with unusually high benefits (or low costs).  It would be more efficient if 
emissions in a given area were determined by the marginal costs and benefits of reducing 
pollution in that area.  The region could be a state like California or any other geographic 
entity with particular air quality problems.7  Second, until recently emissions standards were 
applied uniformly to every vehicle produced rather than to classes or types of vehicles.  This 
raises the costs for manufacturers of complying with emissions standards.  There could be 
substantial cost savings – without reducing benefits – if manufacturers were allowed to meet 
standards by averaging emissions across all new vehicles. In February 2000, the EPA 
7 In fact, because of its unique situation, California has imposed different vehicle emissions standards 
than national standards and several other states have recently followed suit.  Cars registered in these 
states must meet more stringent emissions standards and often subject to more in-use emissions testing 
than in other states. 
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announced new standards for tailpipe emissions of NOx but manufacturers are allowed to 
average emissions across vehicles to comply with the new standard.   
 
3 Policy design for mobile source pollution control 
3.1 The range of policy instruments 
Table 4 shows a range of policy measures that can be used for controlling mobile source 
pollution from traditional direct regulations to measures that encourage voluntary efforts to 
reduce pollution.  Possible regulatory instruments range from outright prohibition of an 
activity (or product) to voluntary agreements that request polluters to curtail a harmful 
activity.  The table also shows for each instrument an example of a specific policy measure 
used in the United States for mobile source pollution control. For example, new vehicles must 
be fitted with a certain type of pollution control equipment (instrument three) and meet an 
emissions performance standard without specifying a particular technology (instrument four).  
Allowing emissions standards to be met across categories of vehicles or by trading emissions 
reduction credits among sources is an example of instrument five.  Performance standards 
may refer to inputs (e.g., limits on the sulfur content of diesel fuels used in vehicles) or 
outputs (e.g., limits on the output of emissions).  Likewise, charges or tradable allowances 
may apply to inputs (e.g., environment-related fuel taxes or transferable lead credits) or 
directly to emissions of the pollutant. 
A distinction is often made between traditional command and control (CAC) 
regulations and market-based instruments (MBIs), but this distinction can be blurred in 
practice.  CAC regulations generally refer to specific directives placed on polluters (the first 
four instruments in the table).  In their purest form, CAC regulations direct polluters what to 
do and how to do it, abatement options are uniform, and emissions reductions are not 
transferable among sources.  An example is the set of technological requirements mandated 
for ozone nonattainment areas, including vapor recovery systems in gasoline pump nozzles 
and the use of clean fuels in new vehicles purchased by centrally fueled fleets.  However, cost 
savings can be achieved by providing sources flexibility in meeting pollution standards.  For 
example, “tradable performance standards” achieve cost savings by allowing sources to trade 
emissions reduction credits earned by reducing emissions beyond mandated standards.  By 
coupling flexibility with rigid emissions standards, the standards can be met more cost-
effectively. 
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Table 4.   Pollution control instruments for mobile sources 
 Examples 
Traditional direct measures  
1. Prohibition of processes, inputs, activities or 
products  
Prohibition of lead in motor fuels 
2. Waste disposal regulations Requirements that solvents, used oils, or other 
products be recycled; charges for disposal of tires 
3. Specific technological requirements Vehicles must be equipped with on-board oxygen 
sensors or vapor-recovery systems 
4. Emissions standards, technology-based or 
performance-based 
Emissions standards for fuel refiners; new-car 
emissions standards 
Economic incentive measures  
5. Transferable emissions reduction credits Credits for scrapped vehicles; transferable 
allowances for fuel refiners; credits to engine 
manufacturers for exceeding emissions standards 
6. Pollution charges Vehicle registration fees based on emissions 
potential; environmental-related taxes on fuels 
7. Subsidies Federal government-automaker program to 
produce clean vehicles 
8. Take-back or refund systems Refundable deposits for lead-acid automotive 
batteries 
9. Legal liability provisions Making drivers responsible for ongoing emissions 
testing 
Other policy measures  
10. Provision of information Emissions or fuel economy information for new 
vehicles 
11. Voluntary agreements Pre-1970 agreements with automakers to reduce 
emissions from new vehicles 
 
In contrast to traditional regulations, MBIs are more flexible and make use of 
financial instruments and market signals to provide incentives for sources to reduce 
emissions.  Examples include transferable discharge permits, emissions charges, subsidies for 
private abatement activities, deposit-refund systems, and other provisions making emitters 
liable for pollution.  Economic incentives can be directly applied to emissions or indirectly 
applied to inputs to an activity that causes pollution.  Well-designed economic incentives 
encourage individual sources to undertake pollution abatement efforts that satisfy both their 
own interests and public policy goals.  Other measures include changes in legal liability 
provisions, provision of information to users, and voluntary agreements.  Information about 
vehicle mileage, emissions, and other characteristics is a public good and can be provided by 
environmental authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and consumer groups.  Much of 
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this information is now available on the internet.8  Voluntary agreements urge, rather than 
require, individual economic agents (individuals or firms) to alter their behavior and cause 
less harm to the environment.    
3.2 Economic considerations  
Economic efficiency in pollution control is achieved when the marginal cost of pollution 
control is equal to the marginal damage caused by the pollution of each source.  If the value 
of damages from pollution is known and emissions from different sources have the same 
impact on environmental quality, then setting a charge equal to marginal damages will 
automatically insure that the environmental target will be met at minimum cost.  Even if 
environmental targets are set on political grounds rather than at the economically efficient 
level, economic instruments can still be used to attain the environmental target at minimum 
cost.  This is the rationale for the use of transferable emissions allowances to control the 
problem of acid rain in the United States and the flexibility mechanisms for controlling 
greenhouse gas emissions in the Kyoto Protocol. 
The reasoning behind this argument is that total abatement costs will be at their 
minimum level when pollution control responsibility is allocated so that marginal abatement 
costs are equalized among the sources.  This result could be achieved by the use of either a 
uniform pollution charge facing all emitters or by issuing transferable emissions allowances 
equal to the pollution target.  With an emissions charge, all sources face the same charge per 
unit of discharge and can choose to continue emitting and pay the charge or control their 
emissions to avoid the charge.  Sources will reduce their discharges until the marginal 
abatement cost is equal to the emissions tax in order to minimize their costs.  Since all sources 
face the same charge per unit of emissions, there is an incentive to control discharges until 
their marginal abatement costs are the same.  Total abatement costs will be minimized 
because sources with low abatement costs will reduce their emissions by more than those with 
high abatement costs.   
A similar result can be achieved with transferable emissions allowances.  The transfer 
of emissions quotas from sources with relatively high abatement costs to those with low 
abatement costs achieves efficient allocation of abatement responsibility.  A form of 
emissions trading occurs when an entity is allowed to average discharges internally across 
8 Examples include the EPA’s Green Vehicles Guide (USEPA 2002c), the ACEEE’s environmental 
guide to cars and trucks (American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 2002), and the U.S. 
Department of Energy/EPA internet site with information on fuel economy, GHG emissions, air 
pollution ratings, and safety information for new and used cars and trucks (US Department of Energy 
and US Environmental Protection Agency 2002). 
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different sources.  For example, new-vehicle emissions standards would be more flexible and 
provide opportunities for cost savings if manufacturers were allowed to average emissions 
across their entire fleet of vehicles, between new and in-use vehicles, etc.  Since they would 
not be required to control emissions uniformly across vehicles or vehicle classes, they could 
choose to achieve greater discharge reductions from low abatement cost sources.  This 
flexibility would allow the overall pollution control target to be met more cost-effectively 
than if a uniform discharge standard were applied to all sources.   
Incentive measures for controlling mobile source pollution should encourage 
motorists to buy “cleaner” vehicles, purchase cleaner fuels, install pollution control 
equipment, travel fewer miles, buy more fuel-efficient vehicles, or alter their driving patterns 
in ways to reduce environmental damages.  Motorists would be expected to meet pollution 
requirements by choosing different amounts of these abatement methods based on their 
relative cost.  Efficient emissions reductions for mobile sources would occur if (1) motorists 
were required to pay charges equal to the marginal damage of their emissions, and (2) an 
economic instrument such as an emissions charge could be applied directly to a vehicle’s 
actual emissions.9  This would be a per-unit charge varying by time, place, and mix of 
emissions in order to reflect their environmental impact.  If continuous monitoring of 
emissions were not feasible, an approximate result could be achieved if charges were based 
on estimated emissions for the type of vehicle, mileage driven, location, etc.  A tax could be 
administered through local vehicle inspection programs and based on the emissions rate and 
number of miles actually traveled for each vehicle.  Thus, the charge would be based on the 
total discharges (actual or estimated) from a specific vehicle during a given period of time and 
could be varied to reflect differences in the severity of regional air-quality problems.   
A second-best result could be achieved through indirect taxes on fuels and vehicles, 
differentiated according to pollution characteristics.  For example, charges for vehicles could 
be differentiated by weight, engine type, or other characteristics.  These policies are not as 
effective as taxing emissions directly because a tax on a product creates an incentive to curtail 
use of the product but not to abate emissions directly.  A tax on the pollutant characteristics of 
an input such as a tax on the sulfur content of diesel fuel can shift demand toward fuels with 
less sulfur content but will not create incentives to abate sulfur emissions by other possibly 
more efficient methods (such as the installation of better technological methods to control 
sulfur emissions).   
9 It is theoretically feasible to duplicate the outcome of emissions tax with a very complicated tax on 
gasoline, but attributes of vehicles such as engine size and pollution control equipment must be 
identifiable at the pump (Fullerton and. West 2002).   
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While fuel taxes can be used when it is difficult to levy charges directly on emissions, 
their environmental effectiveness – the extent to which an increase in a fuel taxes causes a 
decrease in pollution – depends on the quantitative reduction in fuel use in response to 
increased fuel prices, or the price elasticity of demand.  While the demand for motor fuels is 
typically inelastic, demand for a particular type of fuel is more responsive to price changes 
because of the greater availability of substitutes.  Thus, even if overall fuel use may decline 
only modestly as fuel taxes increase, taxes can encourage motorists to substitute among 
different fuels.  For example, diesel fuel is typically taxed at a lower rate than gasoline in 
virtually all European countries and the tax differential has been a factor in causing the use of 
diesel fuel in road transport to increase from 15 percent of the total fuel used in 1970 to 32 
percent in 1999 (OECD 2001b, 34).   
The result with environmental-related fuel taxation could be improved if it were 
supplemented by charges on vehicles reflecting their emission levels.  This could be a tax 
levied at the time of purchase and/or periodically (e.g., quarterly or annually) based on both 
mileage and emissions.  It could be administered through existing inspection programs and 
based on both emissions performance and miles driven for the vehicle.  A combination of 
charges that even more closely approximates a direct emissions tax would include (1) a 
charge on new cars based on emissions performance, (2) an additional periodic registration 
fee according to where the vehicle is registered (e.g., higher in areas not in compliance with 
air quality standards), and (3) an additional periodic charge based on emissions performance.  
A system of vehicle taxes to reflect emissions levels should provide incentives for motorists 
to choose “cleaner” vehicles and for R&D activities to find new abatement technologies.  
Vehicle taxes have the important advantage of being able to influence both in-use and new 
vehicles.  Differentiating annual registration fees by vehicle age can create a financial 
incentive to retire older vehicles earlier.     
3.3 Economic incentive policies in practice 
Although the basic principle of regulating environmental externalities through taxation has 
been known for some time, economic instruments have received very little use compared to 
direct regulations, particularly in controlling mobile source pollution.  Motor vehicle 
emissions are not taxed directly anywhere in the world.  While taxes on fuels and vehicles are 
used extensively, it is only recently that countries have begun to design these taxes to reflect 
potential environmental damages.10  While economic incentive measures have been 
10 See OECD 2001b and USEPA 2001b for a review of the use of economic incentives and 
environmental taxes in OECD countries and the United States, respectively. 
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incorporated in regulations aimed at vehicle manufacturers and fuel refiners to allow them to 
meet mandated standards more cost-effectively, these measures do not directly control mobile 
source emissions.   
The United States has implemented a number of policies to allow greater flexibility 
and reduce the costs for manufacturers to meet mandated performance standards.  Increased 
emphasis has been placed these hybrid programs during the 1990s to allow more stringent 
standards to be met more cost-effectively.  For example, emissions standards for new heavy-
duty engines for trucks and buses were reduced in 1998 and will be reduced further in 2004.  
Manufacturers can comply with the standards by averaging (A), banking (B), and trading (T) 
emissions.  The ABT program gives emissions credits to manufacturers who lower their 
engines’ emissions beyond the performance standard.  The credits are based on the reduction 
in lifetime emissions compared to an engine that exactly meets the standard.  Manufacturers 
can use the credits to offset excess emissions from current-year engines (averaging), save 
them for future use (banking), or sell them to other manufacturers (trading).  This approach 
has been extended to emissions performance standards for other types of vehicles including 
automobiles and light trucks, locomotives, outboard motors for boats, and lawnmowers 
(USEPA 2001b).  Another example is in California, which requires that 10 percent of each 
manufacturer’s fleet be zero-emissions vehicles (ZEVs) by 2003, but manufacturers can 
obtain ZEV credits for clean vehicles that are not pure ZEVs.   
Market-incentive measures have also been introduced by the EPA and some states to 
accelerate the retirement of older, high-emitting vehicles.  In one version of this program, 
vehicles not in conformance with emissions standards can either be repaired and brought into 
compliance or sold and scrapped.  If the scrapped car is sold, the purchaser (often a stationary 
source) is given emissions reduction credits based on the remaining life of the car and the 
estimated number of miles it would have been driven (USEPA 1997).  Other versions of the 
program either pay owners a fixed amount to retire an old vehicle or provide a credit for the 
purchase of a new, less-polluting vehicle.  Congress is also considering proposals to subsidize 
the purchase of new high-mileage, less-polluting electric/gasoline hybrid cars.  Subsidies may 
be required since production of these vehicles has not reached a sufficient level to make their 
prices competitive with comparable gasoline automobiles. 
Most of the existing environmental-based economic measures for mobile sources take 
the form of taxes or registration fees on vehicles and fuels.  In 1995, about 90 percent of the 
revenue from pollution-related taxes in OECD countries came from fees on gasoline, diesel 
fuel, and vehicles (OECD 2001b, 55).  Tax rates on fuels can be differentiated according to 
their technical characteristics to reflect pollution impacts.  In the United States, the federal tax 
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is higher for diesel fuel than for gasoline and lower for special fuels such as ethanol, 
methanol, and liquefied natural gas, and a few state governments also differentiate fuel taxes 
by pollution characteristics.  Several European countries also differentiate fuel taxes based on 
pollution characteristics (though most countries tax on-road diesel fuel at a lower rate than 
gasoline).  Denmark’s gasoline tax is lower in stations with vapor recovery systems, while 
Finland taxes reformulated gasoline at a lower rate than conventional gasoline.  Norway has a 
special sulfur tax on diesel fuel, and Sweden and the United Kingdom vary the tax rate on 
motor fuels depending on their sulfur content.  Finland, Norway, and Sweden have 
implemented an additional CO2 tax based on the carbon content of motor fuels. 
Vehicle sales taxes and registration fees are sometimes differentiated according to 
their emissions characteristics.11  The United States imposes an additional one-time “gas 
guzzler” tax ranging from $1,000 to $7,700 per vehicle based on fuel consumption rates for 
inefficient passenger cars and sport utility vehicles.  In Austria, the one-time registration tax 
(expressed as a percentage of the purchase price) for passenger cars depends on its fuel 
efficiency and is greater for a diesel auto than for a petrol auto that achieves the same 
mileage.  Several European countries differentiate annual passenger car registration fees or 
usage taxes according to environmental impacts as well.  For example, Denmark imposes an 
annual tax on passenger cars based on fuel efficiency.  In Austria, Germany, and Norway, the 
annual registration fee depends on the environmental class of the vehicle as determined by 
European Union classification standards.  The annual vehicle tax in Germany depends on 
cylinder capacity, engine power, and emissions rates, with low-pollution and low-fuel 
consumption vehicles taxes at lower rates.  There is evidence that the differential tax has 
achieved environmental objectives: from July 1997 to January 2000, the stock of high-
emissions cars decreased from 6.9 million to 3 million while the number meeting the tighter 
EURO 2, 3, and 4 emissions standards increased from 6.2 million to nearly 16 million (OECD 
2001b, 104). 
4 Controlling motor vehicle pollution in China 
China has taken some important steps toward reducing air pollution since its first air pollution 
law went into effect in 1987.  Nonetheless, ambient air quality standards for SO2, NOx, and 
TSP – the major the major pollutants that are monitored – were not being met in 67 percent of 
more than 300 cities as of 1999 (Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy, 
11 Some states in the United States differentiate vehicle registration fees according to a vehicle’s 
weight, engine size, and/or number of axles, but these factors do not necessarily reflect a vehicle’s 
environmental impact. 
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China National Environmental Monitoring Center, and Chinese Research Academy of 
Environmental Sciences 2001, 5, hereafter PRCEE et al).  National NOx air quality standards 
are currently exceeded across large areas, including high traffic areas in cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Wuhan, where concentrations of NOx show a clear increasing trend.  Motor 
vehicle emissions are a major source of pollution problems in major cities and account for 45 
to 60 percent of NOx emissions and about 85 percent of CO emissions in typical Chinese 
cities (Walsh 2000, 29).    
Like other countries, China has made greatest progress in controlling industrial 
pollution, which is most amenable to traditional regulatory approaches (World Bank 2001, 
102).  The policy on vehicle pollution control in China is quite similar to policies elsewhere, 
although it is in a much earlier stage of development and not enforced as effectively as it is in 
Europe and the United States.  Like other countries, China places greater emphasis on 
manufacturers than motorists, and while there is interest in applying economic incentive 
measures, they are not widely used.  Key components of China’s strategy to control motor 
vehicle emissions include emissions standards for all categories of new vehicles, phasing out 
leaded gasoline, promotion of cleaner fuels, and establishing inspection and maintenance 
programs for vehicles under use (Walsh 2000).  There has also been a policy in place since 
1985 to discard old vehicles, with specific targets for the number of vehicles to be retired each 
year.     
While China has the advantage of learning from the 30-year experience with motor 
vehicle pollution control policies in the United States, the results of specific policy measures 
may not be directly transferable since they were developed within an institutional context 
specific to the United States.  China is at a different stage in its economic development and 
has considerably less experience implementing and enforcing pollution control regulations 
than the United States.  In addition, there are important differences in the legal system and the 
nature of relationships between economic entities and the state.  Nonetheless, China’s current 
approach to controlling vehicle pollution is modeled after policies developed elsewhere, 
particularly in the United States, so it is likely that China may experience similar difficulties 
in controlling vehicle emissions.    
Like other countries, a major component of China’s mobile source pollution control 
policy is mandatory emissions standards for new vehicles.  While China’s emissions 
standards are scheduled to become more stringent over time, experiences elsewhere have 
shown that strict technological requirements on new vehicles would not be sufficient even if 
they could be strictly enforced.  Poor vehicle maintenance is a leading cause of mobile source 
pollution problems in China (Walsh 2000, 30).  Like other countries, the problem is due to a 
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combination of improperly maintained pollution control equipment, ineffective emissions 
testing and repair programs, and lack of incentives to motorists to reduce vehicle discharges.  
The situation in China is compounded because emissions levels for vehicles currently used in 
China are comparable with the emissions levels that existed in Europe and the United States 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Kebin and Chang 2000, 38).   
The situation could be improved if users of mobile sources were given incentives to 
control emissions since they are ultimately responsible for discharges from vehicles.  A more 
user-oriented approach to controlling emissions from motor vehicles would provide 
incentives to individual motorists to reduce discharges and encourage the development of 
more environmentally-friendly products and processes.  The incentives could take the form of 
pollution charges based on vehicle emissions (actual or estimated) or subsidies to purchase 
more fuel-efficient and less-polluting automobiles.  Fuel taxes should also be differentiated to 
encourage the use of alternative fuels.  While basing pollution charges on actual emissions 
would be ideal, a second-best policy would combine fuel taxes differentiated by pollution 
characteristics with vehicle taxes reflecting emissions characteristics.12   
Taxing vehicles, whether at the time of purchase or through periodic registration fees, 
has the important advantage of being able to influence both in-use vehicles and new vehicles.  
Vehicle taxes should reflect the emissions characteristics of the vehicle – engine size, fuel 
type, fuel efficiency, and gross weight of the vehicle – and vary according to where it is 
registered.  A system of differentiated vehicle taxes can be used to eliminate the bias against 
retiring older cars and also provide incentives for the development of cleaner vehicles and 
new pollution control technologies.  Used in conjunction with taxes on fuels differentiated 
according to environmental characteristics, this policy would be less costly to implement, 
administer, and enforce than a program aimed more directly at vehicle emissions.  Taxes to 
reflect actual or potential pollution costs create incentives to search for new and lower-cost 
abatement technologies.   For example, diesel fuels tend to result in greater amounts of 
particulates and sulfur oxides than gasoline and this should be reflected in the taxes on diesel 
fuel. 
Providing information to motorists about environmental characteristics of vehicles 
such as emissions rates and fuel economy (instrument 10, Table 4) should also be a key 
component of China’s vehicle pollution control policy.  This is a critical role for government 
in any economy because information is a public good and may not be provided through 
12 The extensive road construction program currently under development in China might make it 
practical to use remote-sensing devices in an intelligent transportation system to control discharges 
from vehicles. 
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market channels.  This may be a particularly important role for environmental authorities in 
China since the motor vehicle industry is not yet well-developed.  As the vehicle market 
develops, private sources of such information may tend to emerge.  In the United States, the 
government provides information about vehicles’ fuel economy, air pollution, and safety 
(e.g., USEPA 2002c), and vehicle manufacturers are required to display this information on 
window stickers on all new vehicles.  Private market sources also rate vehicles according to 
various characteristics.  With newly-emerging markets in China, this type of information is 
less available than in more advanced market economies, so the government can play a 
particularly important role in assisting motorists to make more informed vehicle purchases. 
Another issue is whether vehicle emissions standards should be uniform across all 
regions in China.  Because the environmental impact of a vehicle depends on when and where 
it is driven, there is a strong case for allowing vehicle emissions to vary across regions.  
Emissions standards might need to be more stringent in highly populated urban areas or other 
areas that would not otherwise be able to meet air quality standards.  While uniform 
emissions standards reduce costs to vehicle manufacturers, they would only be consistent with 
meeting uniform ambient air quality standards if all of the factors determining vehicle 
emissions and air quality were identical everywhere.  This is clearly not the case in large 
urban areas or where there are unusual geographic or weather conditions.  Unless uniform 
emissions standards were set at a level sufficiently stringent to achieve ambient air quality 
standards under all circumstances, it would be necessary to take additional measures to 
control vehicle emissions in the most sensitive receptor areas.   
In the United States, certain regions would not be able to achieve ambient air quality 
standards without enacting more stringent policies than the federal standards.  A similar 
situation exists in China.  However, given the division of responsibility among national and 
municipal government levels in setting environmental policies in China, major cities like 
Beijing and Shanghai can exert a significant effect on both manufacturers and motorists 
through their pollution control policies.  Beijing, in particular, has taken aggressive efforts to 
control vehicle pollution, including phasing in new-car emissions standards ahead of the 
national schedule, requiring car manufacturers in China to retrofit all vehicles sold in Beijing 
from 1995 to 1998 with pollution control technology to meet Euro 1 standards, and 
retrofitting taxis and buses to use natural gas rather than diesel fuel (Walsh 2000).  Such 
actions can have a powerful effect on market developments, such as developing cleaner 
vehicles and fuels, in a manner similar to the effect that California’s more stringent policies 
have had in the United States.  Economic incentive measures can be used to help meet more 
stringent standards in particular areas.  For example, vehicle manufacturers and fuel refiners 
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could be given pollution credits for exceeding clean vehicle or clean fuel requirements.  This 
would allow stricter standards to be met at lower cost and provide continuing incentives to 
seek out new, lower-cost production methods and technologies to conform to regulations.    
During the 1990s, there has been greater emphasis in China on using economic 
incentives to achieve environmental objectives, including a pilot SO2 trading project in two 
medium-sized cities (Dudek et al 2001, Sun 2001).  Nonetheless, applying prices and market 
principles to environmental services will necessarily take time to evolve as China moves 
gradually toward a more market-based economy.  Even in the United States, the use of 
economic incentives took time to develop.  For example, credits for reducing air pollution 
discharges beyond mandated performance standards were first introduced in the mid-1970’s 
to allow averaging of emissions across entities (offsets) or individual sources within a single 
entity (bubbles).  However, it was 1995 before emissions trading was implemented as part of 
a pollution control program to control acidic deposition, as mandated by Title IV of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments. 
Important institutional requirements must be met for any environmental regulation to 
be effective, but this is particularly true for economic instruments such as emissions trading.  
Emissions allowances are intangible property rights, and legal institutions must be able to 
insure the integrity of the emissions trading system.  Rights and responsibilities must be clear 
to all parties and enforced by courts.  The transparency of the U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions 
trading program has also been important.  Information on the allocation of allowances, 
emissions data, allowance transactions, and permit requirements are all available for public 
review.13  The institutional requirements for implementing emission charges and pollution-
related fuel and vehicle taxes are less stringent but still require administration and 
enforcement to achieve their goals.  
China may be able to implement limited forms of emissions trading in mobile source 
pollution control.  The most obvious applications would be to complement existing 
regulations that encourage scrapping of old high-emitting vehicles and to allow vehicle 
manufacturers and refineries to meet mandated performance standards more cost-effectively.  
While these programs do not put an overall ceiling on discharges, they provide a continuing 
incentive to seek less costly methods to reduce emissions beyond mandated standards.  The 
program could at first be limited to internal trading within a single economic entity to allow 
greater flexibility in meeting pollution control standards.  The credits would allow the entity 
to average emissions across a certain type of product (e.g., automobiles produced) or across a 
13 See USEPA 2002a. 
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number of discharge points (e.g., plants within a manufacturing firm).  The program could be 
expanded to allow credits to be banked for future use or traded to other entities.  This would 
involve relatively limited numbers of bilateral or intra-firm trades rather than extensive inter-
firm trading on a well-organized exchange.   
Programs like these may be particularly suitable for use in China because they can be 
used in conjunction with traditional regulatory standards.  For example, vehicle manufacturers 
or importers might be allowed some form of averaging within their fleet or given credits for 
exceeding emissions standards for certain vehicles.  Even greater cost savings could be 
achieved if emissions trading were allowed among vehicle manufacturers (or importers).  The 
commodity that would be traded is estimated emissions reductions over the useful life of the 
vehicle, and manufacturers would earn emissions reduction credits for lowering their engines’ 
emissions beyond the performance standard.  The credits could be used by the source to offset 
excess emission reductions from current-year standards, transferable to other sources, or 
banked for possible future use.  While this program would not represent a significant 
departure from traditional approaches, it would extend China’s ongoing (experimental) efforts 
with economic incentives such as emissions fees and emissions trading for industrial pollution 
management.  By allowing pollution standards to be met more cost-effectively, standards can 
be more stringent than they might otherwise be. 
Regardless of the specific policies, all require government authority to establish and 
administer the regulations, measure and monitor performance, and enforce compliance.  
While it is clear that the government of China has the authority to establish regulations, a 
recent evaluation of China’s vehicle pollution control laws concludes that, while important 
changes to regulations have been recently made, they have not been effectively enforced 
(PRCEE et al 2001, 65).  The problem may be partly related to the early stage of development 
of the environmental legal system in China.  However, in addition to improving the 
operational aspects and enforcement of the program, such as testing procedures for new 
vehicles and inspection and maintenance requirements for vehicles in use, it is important that 
the liabilities and responsibilities for controlling pollution from motor vehicles be made clear.  
Once the legal liabilities are clarified, incentive mechanisms can be employed to allow 
environmental goals to be met more effectively. 
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5 Conclusions 
The Chinese government has encouraged the use of private automobiles as part of an 
economic development strategy.  For this strategy to be sustainable, however, it is important 
that the environmental implications of increased motor vehicle use be considered.  There are 
important weaknesses in existing policies to control vehicle pollution in China, and further 
steps will need to be taken to control vehicle pollution if China is to meet ambient air quality 
standards.  Rather than employing traditional regulatory approaches, the government should 
focus on making motorists accountable for the full costs of using motor vehicles.  Economic 
incentive measures could be gradually introduced to complement existing regulations.  The 
government should also ensure that information is provided to motorists about fuel economy, 
emissions, and other environmental characteristics of vehicles.  Based on the U.S. experience, 
environmental authorities in China should place particular emphasis on (1) clarifying liability 
arrangements for maintaining emissions performance of vehicles under use, (2) extending 
emissions controls to all mobile sources, including non-road sources, (3) introducing 
flexibility provisions to allow standards to be met cost-effectively, and (4) encouraging local 
environmental protection bureaus to adopt economic incentive measures to achieve local 
environmental targets.   
Economic incentives will become more appealing as abatement levels become more 
ambitious and people become more aware of the increasing costs of environmental protection. 
While economic incentive measures allow environmental objectives to be achieved at lower 
cost than traditional regulatory methods, they should be phased in over time in China so as to 
be compatible with China’s political, economic and legal system.  Incremental improvements 
building on the existing regulatory system – such as the early U.S. experience with emissions 
credits – may be the most appropriate way to reach the ultimate goal of managing pollution 
efficiently.  Instruments such as emissions trading must be developed within a specific 
institutional context, but require transparency and an effective legal system to insure the 
integrity of the program. 
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